The Orderer’s Dilemma: How Ideological Foreign Policy Justifications Galvanize Domestic Publics but Promote Conflict
Overview: My first book project explores how powerful states build support for the international orders they lead. I use natural language processing on leader speeches and policy documents to build a data set of hierarchical legitimation strategies (1816-2014). This allows me to analyze the tradeoffs leaders face between framing international leadership in terms of their ideology vs. performance (i.e., the ability to provide international goods and solve common problems). I find that when states emphasize ideology in their legitimation rhetoric, they fight more wars.
Abstract: The United States faces two great powers who challenge the terms of the international order and the U.S. role in it. U.S. leaders have identified this threat and are using ideological rhetoric to mobilize the public for costly economic and military competitions. Debates have tended to focus on the merits of specific policies while taking for granted that the effort should emphasize the autocratic nature of the challengers. This book focuses on an under-appreciated strategic choice: how to frame the stakes of geopolitical competition. Leading states face a dilemma. Ideological appeals tap into deeply held beliefs and identities, allowing leaders to mobilize their publics to bear the burden of an active foreign policy. While these appeals may also resonate with a limited set of foreign audiences, their inherent particularism means that they can never gain universal appeal. Instead, ideologies create divisions between countries who share more interests than values. Using an original dataset of foreign policy rhetoric, I find evidence that when states use an ideological framing to justify their international leadership, they fight more wars. By contrast, a framing that centers on solving shared problems produces less international conflict.
Abstract: The United States faces two great powers who challenge the terms of the international order and the U.S. role in it. U.S. leaders have identified this threat and are using ideological rhetoric to mobilize the public for costly economic and military competitions. Debates have tended to focus on the merits of specific policies while taking for granted that the effort should emphasize the autocratic nature of the challengers. This book focuses on an under-appreciated strategic choice: how to frame the stakes of geopolitical competition. Leading states face a dilemma. Ideological appeals tap into deeply held beliefs and identities, allowing leaders to mobilize their publics to bear the burden of an active foreign policy. While these appeals may also resonate with a limited set of foreign audiences, their inherent particularism means that they can never gain universal appeal. Instead, ideologies create divisions between countries who share more interests than values. Using an original dataset of foreign policy rhetoric, I find evidence that when states use an ideological framing to justify their international leadership, they fight more wars. By contrast, a framing that centers on solving shared problems produces less international conflict.